Subject: Re: Batcat article update From: "Bill Person" Date: Sat, 05 Aug 2006 16:05:49 -0500 To: westin@tdstelme.net Okay, Larry, Here goes: BATCATS: SENSORS GO TO WAR (By Bill Person) I was the Queen Bee Delta Project Officer from March to May 1965, and had been involved in the secret part of iniatiating Operation Rolling Thunder. From my vantage point, I saw that the air war, and thereby the entire war was not going to be a successful war. Two years later, I was back with the 553rd Reconnaissance Wing Batcats for a war that had escalated on both sides with no clear winner. The ”Supreme Perfumed Prince,” General William C. Westmorland was not “being all you can be,” Army’s idea in the Vietnam War. Operation Rolling Thunder was originally intended to last only a few weeks but was still in progress. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS had a plan to bomb 94 strategic targets, listing 270 specific target that would have rendered North Vietnam incapable of waging a war in the south. It was the Rules of Engagement that prohibited actually inflicting injury to North Vietnam and served to stir the people against America, not dishearten them as Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara alleged. It was an inconvenience rather than being outright destructive which served to embolden the enemy’s resolve against us. Each time the President Johnson called for a ‘cease fire,’ North Vietnam used that time to succor and strengthen their military positions. It was as if LBJ and RSM had never heard of strategic bombing despite having the Strategic Air Command at the ready all during the Cold War. If LBJ had served notice that the U.S. was closing the ports of North Vietnam and would destroy any ship bringing in supplies, there would not have been a war and no 58,000 American names on a shiny black wall. Nine college professors were invited to a Pentagon funded ‘Think Tank’. Their objective was to devise a plan to “Impede the flow of men and materials down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.” America, regardless of Robert Strange McNamara’s insistence to President Johnson, was not winning the minds and hearts of the Vietnamese people in the south. The other part of that was to discourage the will of the people in North Vietnam to support a war in the south. The nine professors did propose a cheap method, a relative term for a merely a billion tax dollars, of ‘impeding’ Hanoi’s waging a war against South Vietnam. Their recommendation was to use surplus Navy C-121 Super Constellations as an airborne platform from which to detect movement using sensors that were seeded along the trail in the Laotian panhandle and on Route 9 on northern South Vietnam. This was dubbed “College Nine” for the Think Tank members. Their recommendation included the use of modifying radio receivers, ARR-52s, with submarine type detecting sonobuoys that were also modified as land-based sensors, all in house available items. This was renamed “Practice Nine” and ordered into Research and Development. Apparently the Pentagon knew that because LBJ had not employed their plan to bomb 94 strategic targets within three weeks of the real Rolling Thunder, another approach was needed. McNamara convinced LBJ not to focus on an outright total devastation type bombing of North Vietnam, but rather hit more inoffensive obscure targets with the intent of demonstrating our superior capability. This method failed of course and the Pentagon did not bother to use the word “halt” in supplying the Viet Cong because that was not a possibility, ‘impede’ was. The Air Force had purchased 30 converted Navy Willie Victors, serial numbers from 67-21471 to 67-21500. They were used in a McNamara Priority One Project called a lot of names. Many are not listed here and rightfully so. By June 1967, the Defense Communications Planning Group, DCPG, an offshoot civilian agency operating out of the old Navy building in Washington, took charge and initiated testing and developing now dubbed “Muscle Shoals” and “Dune Moon.” 41 crews were amassed, processed and training commenced along with a lot of necessary testing. A huge Air Defense type blockhouse was constructed at Nakhon Phanom to house the newly formed Task Force Alpha, a mostly civilian agency to operate the new ground portion of the system. Along with huge blockhouse were four massive rotating frame-work type dish antennas on derrick mounts. Apparently the civilian “Task Farce Awful” leaders did not think the Air Force could handle the mission. The 553rd Reconnaissance Wing with its two Squadrons, the 553rd and 554th were formed at Otis AFB, Massachusetts where most of the crew training took place. The testing of the airborne system that detected sensor activations on the ground took place at Eglin AFB, Florida. Taking advantage of the wooded terrain, Army Special Forces were used to hike along the trails and activate the ground implaced sensors. There were a few incidents involving minor injuries with exploding Dragonteeth and a lot of Button Bomblets washing up on the beach at Fort Walton Beach, Florida. As usual, a plausible “damage control” was aired and the testing continued. A flight crew consisted of 19 members, an aircraft commander, a co-pilot, two navigators, an electronics warfare officer, EWO, two flight engineers, a radio operator, a Combat Information Control Officer, CICO, eight Combat Information Monitors, CIMs and two electronics technicians. A plexi-glass plotting board was positioned across the aisle from the CICO’s position in the back. By October and November, 1967, the wing deployed to Korat (Nakhon Ratchasima) Royal Thai Air Base, Thailand in two waves. The Navy’s VO-67 was in place February 1967 to July 1968 at NKP when the 553rd deployed to Korat. Tail Code “MR,” Mud River was used on the P2V Neptunes that truly laid the ground work for Igloo White, the ‘beep and bang’ electronic fence war. The deployment took place in two waves of ten planes each beginning in October 1967 and the 553rd Wing was in place and conducting RFI or radio frequency interference missions by December. The Batcats were operational by the end of 1967. The sensor monitoring activity began with three orbits and quickly expanded to a fourth with the Tet Offensive and Siege of Khe Sanh on January 30, 1968. As the CIMs called in “hits” on their radio monitors, indicating activity down on the ground, this movement was plotted on the board. The CICO had an encrypted radio, an ARC-109 with a KY-8 paddle set scrambler to communicate with other Batcat aircraft and Task Force Alpha at Nakhon Phanom. The CICO panel also had other UHF, VHF and HF radio capabilities. The plane employed, in addition to the CIMs, who were considered as merely backup, an “X” band transmitter to relay all the sensor beeps on to NKP. At TFA’s blockhouse (Task Force Alpha or as we called it, “Task Farce Awful), giant computers processed the signals and plotted them on a printer. Once a truck convoy was determined, as programmed by the computer, a report was generated. TFA was staffed by civilians, highly overpaid, tax-deferred who sent off a “Spotlight Report.” Ironically, the CIMs were especially trained in their sensor monitoring and were better at ‘reading’ the input from sensors than the programmed computer at TFA. Also, the CICO had the superior advantage of listening in on the air war to know when it was a ‘target rich’ or ‘take the bombs home’ time. Direct radio contact with ABCCC could send ordnance-laden fighters to an on-going truck activity while TFA’s computer could only estimate where and enemy truck might be at a projected time after computing the speed. Then, the truck was rarely in position to be hit as if TFA anticipated a truck convoy rather than a single truck. TFA members had gone to 7th AF and most of the bases, 7/13th AF at Udorn to sell the importance of these reports. The Airborne Communications and Combat Control ship, ABCCC maintained two orbits in the Laos panhandle around the clock. “Cricket” day and “Allycat” night flew “Barrel Roll” and “Hillsboro” day and “Moonbeam" night in “Steel Tiger,” the south part. Forward Air Controllers, FACs were assigned a sector and when they had targets, ABCCC sent them fighters to strike them. The computer at NKP, Nakhon Phanom (Naked Phanny) was programmed to detect movement of trucks going past a string of four sensors placed along a road on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. TFA erroneously thought truck convoys formed up at Hanoi and drove down close to Saigon much like truck convoys back in the states. In fact, it was a shuttle/relay type of supply system designed to dodge our ever-watchful eyes of FACs and bomb-laden jets. The enemy used a shuttle system of short distances for the trucks along with a host of continuous bicycles and foot traffic in addition to the trucks. Sold on the importance of “Spotlights,” ABCCCs sent FACs to check on these high priority targets. But, as it turned out, the trucks never responded as TFA’s computers thought. When the FAC got to the predicted location indicated in the “Spotlight,” nothing was there. The trucks had pulled-up and stopped or else turned off the road in a covered area, but did not get to the place predicted by TFA. After a while, ABCCCs and FACs stopped responding to the urgent “Spotlight” messages. Again, TFA would make the rounds selling the importance of their highly prized “Spotlights.” I knew about this and back during the middle of January 1968, I punched in the illuminated on/off button to listen in on one of our Accubuoy (acoustic/sonic) sensors. I heard the unmistakable squeaking sounds of a tracked vehicle moving down the road. Curious, I began to punch buttons to hear several more of these tracked vehicles. I consulted the detailed map of the area to see that a lot of bomb craters were blown in that section of Route 9 of the trail. These vehicles were going around them and proceeding on down the trail. This old Texas boy knew the sounds of a bulldozer from growing up in the oil patch and also in ranch and farm country. The powerful diesel engine is set at a high rev while the gears are changed to move back and forth while working the blade to do the dirt moving work. This was not the case here and I heard more and more of the tracked vehicles move down the trail in a widely spread spacing. I kept notes and when I got back to Korat, I insisted our Operations Center fire off a message reporting tanks moving down the trail towards South Vietnam. I will never forget the enthusiasm I generated at the newly constructed 553rd RCW Ops Center when we sent out that message and waited for an answer. In fact, I had served in the additional duty special project as Wing Beautification Officer. I had driven one of our pick-up trucks into Korat and instructed some airmen with me to dig up banana plants and a bunch of other flora to plant around the new headquarters buildings. I suppose that I was thought of as something special by ranking members of my fellow Batcats. When the message came in from PACAF and 7th AF at Ton Son Nhut, it stated that Air Force estimates did not assess NVA with possessing tanks. It went on to suggest what I had heard might have been bulldozers doing repair work on bomb craters on the trail. I fumed and exclaimed that this Texas boy sure as hell knew what a bulldozer sounded like, and these were damn sure tanks. I had served as Queen Bee Delta Project Officer from March to May 1965 and oversaw the monitoring of communications of North Vietnam at the start of Rolling Thunder. I knew that the enemy had no air defense capabilities when we started bombing low grade and ineffective targets, contrary to JCS recommendations. As our target selection was raised, so were Hanoi’s capabilities to defend against us. I had served as the SSO to Eastern CONAD/NORAD Region at Stewart AFB. New York and had seen the CIA report and briefed the general on how the Soviets were paying 100,000 Chinese Coolies with shovels to fill in bomb craters along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Obviously the bulldozers and other support personnel could not keep up with the inflicted damage to keep the resupply route open. So, in the mindset of AF intelligence, it was logical that the sounds I heard was a bulldozer, not a tank. A little more than a week later, on February 7, 1968, the Special Forces camp at Lang Vei reported tanks. David “Bulldog” Smith was the commander there at the time. As a matter of fact, it was at 0035 hours, Sergeant Nikolas Fragos the Tactical Observations Center tower reported, “They’ve got tanks!” He went on to say, “I don’t know how many, but they have tanks out there!” Captain Frank C. Willoughby asked, “Where the hell are they?” “We have two tanks in our wire!” Fragos shouted. An unknown station then added, “We’ve got five tanks in line right at our wire!” Then the same voice said, “We’ve got tanks inside our wire – I said inside our wire!” When our headquarters did acknowledge this fact, they said that these were 13 Soviet-built PT-76 amphibious type armored vehicles, not tanks. What ever they were, they sure as hell kicked the shit out of our Army Special Forces at Lang Vei and then moved against the Marines at Khe Sanh. That was the start of the infamous Tet Offensive and the 77 day Siege of Khe Sanh. My brother-in-law, Marine 1stLt Marion Henry (Hank) Norman was killed there on March 29th. Hank was the FO to B Company, 1st Division, 26th Marines. An FO or Forward Observer is a trained artillery director that is the liaison between his unit and the big guns. Because of the technicality, headquarters never admitted to my correct assessment about tanks, not bulldozers. I did read about the PT-76 not being a tank, but an amphibious armored tracked vehicle. I seriously doubt the Special Forces at Lang Vei appreciated that distinction. Some time later, while flying up near the DMZ, I was watching the lights go on and off on the CICO panel display and checking the activity on the plotting board, against the area map. I noticed that a truck with a rather loud exhaust, and running in low gear at high rev would go past some of the sensors but never got to the fourth one in a string of four. Then, a bit later, it went back north again. This was just south of the Ben Hai River on our Blue Orbit, which was up near the DMZ and above the Rock Pile and Con Thien, all just south of the river. I began to observe a repeating event of the truck and I just employed my old Security Service Intelligence creative thinking process. It occurred to me that this was where the NVA brought supplies and ammo down the coast on Route 1 to the DMZ, then west to a point where their sampans ferried the stuff across the Ben Hai River. I managed to imagine that there were ammo/supplies storage parks on both sides of the river. Then, running south a short way along a trail south from the river, the road had a spur back to the west and I imagined that there under a grove of trees, was another, a third ammo dump. I got the timing down for the repeating trips of the truck and then called ABCCC. This time, I wasn’t going to leave such an important discovery up to some weenie up the chain of command. I knew damned well TFA would want their computer to make the call about its ‘target worthiness’ and nothing would ever be done. The TAC Air fighters were fussing to find them targets before they ran out of fuel and had to drop their bombs in a safe area to then be detonated by ground ordnance techs. They wanted 'counters' for their bombs with real BDA (bomb damage assessment). The ABCCC answered and I asked him if he could go secure voice with me on a discrete freq. He said he could and we made contact via scrambler on a different frequency from TFA. I didn’t want them to hear me. I told Moonbeam about my suspicions and that I had heard the jet jocks screaming for targets, not wanting to drop their ordnance on a harmless disposal area. They were running low on fuel and wanted the mission to count for something. The EC-130 ABCCC controller probably was surprised to hear from another aluminum cloud like me, up there crowding the 'friendly skies of SEA' but he was so desperate for good target info he'd probably have talked to anyone. I gave Moonbeam the coordinates and he sent Covey in to check it out. I had timed it so the truck would be back at the river taking on another load. Covey, a FAC spotted what he thought might be something under some trees. He marked it with a Mighty Mite smoke rocket and two Ubon-based F4Cs were cleared in hot. Luckily, they were spread and Two barely veered off because Lead’s bombs set the entire grove off in a tremendous series of explosions. I could hear him on the other clear tactical frequency. “My God, watch it, Two! Looks like the whole world blew up?” Lead shouted. Two broke it off and barely missed the billowing fireball. Moonbeam got a BDA, bomb damage assessment of an estimated 270 secondary explosions from that ammo dump. ABCCC relayed, as I heard also, a call for another target like that one. I gave him the location I was sure was the place where the truck might be loading up again. I checked myself in telling Moonbeam that I could hear the explosions on several acoustic sensors on the ground but I was afraid he might relay that and compromise our mission. It was frustrating to be the cause of what must have been a brilliant fireworks display down there and not see it. I was in the darkened back end of a Super Connie boring holes in the sky and back where it made no difference if it was daylight or dark outside. This time, Covey marked it and F4C Two, the wingman delivered his load. (270 was a number they used when it happened too quick and was too many to count) “BOOM!” another estimated 270 secondaries. And probably a truck to boot. From the illumination of the explosions, the FAC could see activity across the river. A bunch of the tiny square green lights on the CICO panel lit up also. The area across the river was called Tally Ho, Route Pack One. When Covey swooped over to mark it with another Mighty Mite white phosphorus smoke rocket, he accidentally hit and ignited that ammo supply dump himself. The next two F-4cs from Ubon had already been cleared down to their perch for a strike but when their target erupted in fire and explosions, they were cleared in to make road cuts along the access road east of there where Route 1 joined that position. They hoped to bag a supply-laden truck but nothing spectacular was detected by Covey as he orbited nearby to check it out. Just some nice bombs exploding on the jungle road that evening. Needless to say, Moonbeam and a bunch of jet jocks got all highly enthused about the Batcats from Korat. However, like all good wars, fun is the first casualty. TFA also learned of this inter-unit unauthorized communication cooperatrion and all future such direct contact with ABCCCs were prohibited. I tried it directly with FACs and jet jocks too, but that too, was banned. So, it was back to ignoring Spotlight reports, gaining a term for a Lamar Cranston, or the Shadow Reports. If anybody was going to take any bows, it had to be Task Farce Awful, OOPS, Task Force Alpha. I did get a chance to officially pose the question, “Since the TFA complex was just across the Me Kong from Takhet, Laos, a known VC rife town, and in range for a mortar barrage, who would serve as back-up to TFA? TFA proudly announced a planned solution. They were simply going to build another complex down south of there on the Me Kong. Maybe near Ubon. That never happened thankfully. They say, never stand too close behind a high-ranking civilian, (military officer either). You might get beat to death when he pats himself on the back. I had the distinctive honor of learning that lesson anew when I returned to the states in September 1968. I had been directed to personally brief President Johnson when I got to the Ft. Meade area. I called the number I was given back at Korat and was directed to a rather plain Army office to wait. When LBJ arrived, he wanted to know how the sensor program was working and I told him, great, if you let the Air Force handle it and send the Task Force Alpha civilian jokers home. I tried to explain that their approach was not geared for tactical combat, but they wanted us to try to make it work anyway. I told him that it was just pissing off the jet jocks and wasting a lot of ordnance busting trees back in the "Enemy Friendly War," as the pilots were calling it. Up until then, I thought it was LBJ’s advisors who were ‘ruining’ the war but my disappointment came when I discovered that it was the big Texan himself as well as “Number-cruncher” ‘Edsel Bob’ McNamara. I don't think LBJ like my answer and I suspect he had friends in "high pay, show places." He never understood the war he had inherited from FDR and each ensuing president before him. Franklin promised Stalin that the U.S. would not go to war with Russia over any country west of Japan as a condition to entering the war against Japan. We didn’t, but the Soviets killed a lot more Americans than anyone will ever admit, war or not. That was America’s price for saving lives by letting Russia capture and occupy Berlin, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, and for entering the war against Japan on the day we dropped the second atomic bomb. The Russians held us to our promises but they reneged on most of theirs, guess they were better at detente than we were. The End