A Summary of the loss of EC-121R 67-21493, April 25, 1969 This information is the "Releaseable" part of the official accident report. This information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Date of Original Report - 9 May 69 Retyped by Larry Westin - March 5, 2000 11a History of Flight: On 25 April 1969, an EC-121R, Number 67-21493, callsign "BATCAT 21" crew number 39 from the 554th Recon Sq, Korat RTAFB, was scheduled for a combat tactical mission directed by frag order number 115, mission number 6901. Scheduled mission briefing time was 1315, taxi time 1530, and takeoff time 1600 (all times in this narrative are local), for a flight from Korat to the combat zone and return. Pertinent aircrew positions were: Aircraft commander; (Pilot)-Lt Col Heller; Co-pilot -Major Lunsford; Flight Engineer -TSgt Fowler. Mission briefing consisted of a standard 553d Recon Wg briefing. The main points covered in this briefing were the Frag Order, Weather, Special Operations, Intelligence, Crew Instructions, and Emergency Instructions. Weather briefing, utilizing slides and telephone, was standard and contained specific forecast for BATCAT 21's takeoff time of intermittent conditions with winds variable in direction at 20 knots with gusts to 35 knots, visibility reduced to 2 miles in thunderstorms with rain showers and associated dust storm. In addition, due to variable weather conditions, the pilot was advised to contact weather on 344.6 prior to takeoff for updated weather. (Blanked word) Special operations briefing presented by the 553d Recon Wg Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Duty Controller contained a number of mission items and specifically included Crew Briefing Instructions, dated 17 April 1969, covering weather conditions during the Southwest Monsoon Season. Those instructions included a review of the 553d Recon Wg policy of no takeoffs or landings when thunderstorms are in the near vicinity of the airbase. (Blanked word) Intelligence, crew instructions and emergency instructions briefed were normal and were not relevant to the accident. The crew then proceeded to the 554th Recon Sq Squadron Operations Center equipment section to pick up the required crew kits and survival equipment. Pre- flight of the aircraft was normal using the prescribed checklists and BATCAT 21 called mission ready at 1449 hours. Programmed fuel load was 8030 gallons and calculated takeoff weight was 132,000 pounds. BATCAT 21 started engines approximately 1520 and commenced taxi to run-up position at 1530. After completing engine run-up, BATCAT 21 was cleared for takeoff by Korat Tower at 1554 and was advised to contact departure control. BATCAT 21 established contact with departure control and requested information on the position, direction of movement and speed of the thunderstorm cell near the base. (Blanked word). Departure control advised BATCAT 21 that the thunderstorm was over the base and extended 20 miles southwest. BATCAT 21 requested a right turn after takeoff and radar vectoring around the thunderstorms. BATCAT 21 was requested to maintain runway heading and departure control would vector the aircraft around the thunderstorms. Prior to becoming airborne, BATCAT 21 was advised that he was cleared to turn right to two eight zero degrees. BATCAT 21 reported airborne at 1558 and departure control advised the heading was two eight zero degrees and he would radar identify BATCAT 21. BATCAT 21 acknowledged his vector to two eight zero and a short time later requested to make a right turn if possible as it was very turbulent. Korat departure control approved the request. No further transmissions were received from BATCAT 21. The aircraft impacted with the ground approximately 1559, 3.7 miles off the departure end of runway 24 on the 260 degree radial of the Korat TACAN. (Blanked out words) the impact occurred less than one-half minute after the co-pilot's last transmission. Distance from takeoff to impact indicates a total flight duration of approximately 2 minutes. (Blanked out sentence.) 1. Mission: The Frag Order, including intended route of flight, orbit area, altitude and duration of flight, is classified Secret and contains nothing relevant to the accident except confirmation of a scheduled 1600 takeoff time. 2. Preflight Preparation: Pertinent information is provided in paragraph 11a. 3. (This entire paragraph is completely blanked out, about 47 lines.) 4. Impact: (Blanked word). The aircraft's initial point of touchdown was 3.7 miles from the runway on the 260 degree radial of the Korat TACAN. Configuration upon impact was gear up, engine power METO. Terrain in the crash area was generally flat hard clay soil with a low rolling hill separating two areas of rice paddies. There were widely scattered trees and tree stumps in the area. Initial point of impact (as evidenced by gouge marks from all four propellers) was in a rice paddy on a heading of 281 degrees. Attitude at time of touchdown was wings and fuselage level. Measurement of the propeller gouges indicate an impact ground speed of 221 knots. (Blanked out words) area wind damage indicate a 60 to 70 knot tailwind. Indicated airspeed was approximately 150-160 knots. As the aircraft traversed the rice paddies the under part of the wings and the propellers began to disintegrate. A dike separating the rice paddies, 80 yards from impact, started the disintegration of the accessory section of the engines. The right wing then struck a tree stump causing the path of the aircraft to veer slightly right. It continued on this path an additional 30 yards, struck another stump and returned to its original path across the ground, striking a tree with the number 2 engine and exploding 255 yards from impact. The fuselage continued down the rolling hill separating the two rice paddy areas and flipped to the right (the right side of the cockpit being the pivot point), finally coming to rest 300 yards from the touchdown point. 5. Ejection: Not applicable. 6. Survival: Not applicable, (several Blanked out words) 7. Rescue: Not applicable. 8. Crash Response: Once initiated, search and crash response was excellent. PEDRO 33, rescue HH-43B, was airborne at 1624, six minutes after search request was made, and located the crash site at 1629. Upon notification, the tower controller activated the primary crash net. The secondary crash net alert was completed at 1631. PEDRO 33 landed at the crash site and, utilizing an airborne relay, established communications with the control tower. At 1632 aeromedical technician verified there were no survivors. PEDRO 33 returned to base, picked up the fire suppression kit and extinguished the remaining fire at the crash scene. Base medical personnel were alerted by the primary crash net and a flight surgeon with two medical personnel departed for base Operations immediately. The Director of Base Medical services, knowing the second rescue helicopter was inoperative, called the Army flying detachment for helicopter support. By the time the medical personnel arrived at the ramp, the helicopter was ready. The Flight Surgeon, accompanied by the Support Group Commander and one Medical Technician arrived at the crash scene at 1650. The disaster control convoy was formed within thirty minutes and proceeded to the crash site arriving at 1725. In the interim all necessary personnel for recovery of the bodies and securing the crash area had been ferried to the site via helicopters. 9. Maintenance: The aircraft sustained major damage and was classified as totally destroyed. All historical records except the current 781A were available for investigation. The majority of aircraft parts and components were damaged to the extent that it was very difficult to obtain conclusive results from examination. The examination of parts available revealed no maintenance or material deficiency prior to impact. Engines and propeller systems received major damage. From inspection of engines and propellers it was determined that all engines were operating at METO power. At impact, all propeller blade tips sheared approximately in 6 inch lengths with forward bending indicating high RPM and positive thrust. Some engine cylinders and power recovery turbines were found approximately 150 yards from the first impact point. The cockpit area was completely destroyed by severe impact and fire which prohibited determination of instrument readings and switch/handle positions (blanked word). 10. Maintenance Personnel: Not applicable. 11. Engine and Engine Components: Not applicable. 12. Airframe and Component Parts: Not applicable. 13. Systems: Not applicable. (What is most likely paragraph 14, about 33 lines, is completely blanked out.) 15. Pilot Qualifications: Lt Col Heller, the aircraft commander and pilot flying the left seat, was an experienced pilot, having accumulated 5583 flying hours, 1109 of which had been in the C-121. He began requalifying in the C-121 in July of 1968 to serve in his third armed conflict. Since that time he has averaged over 50 hours flying time each month. Prior to being assigned to SEA he had been very closely associated with Air Traffic Control as the commander of Madrid Flight Service Center. His supervisors have repeatedly commented on his efforts to promote and emphasize safety in both assignments. In the previous 30 days Lt Col Heller had flown 59.3 hours on 6 combat missions, averaging almost 9.9 hours per mission. On those six missions 6.0 hours of instrument, 24.6 hours of first pilot and 10.7 hours of AC time was logged. Since his arrival at Korat in November of 1968 he had received an initial local proficiency checkride, a combat proficiency (theater indoctrination) flight and a no-notice checkride, all documented on AF Forms 8; the no- notice check was administered on 17 Jan 69 (blanked word). All remarks indicate him to be conscientious, thorough and well qualified to perform his duties as Aircraft Commander. Major Lunsford, in the right seat, also had extensive flying experience, having accumulated 6607 hours, of which 4388 were in the C-121. Prior to being assigned to Korat he had been Director of Safety at Major Command level. His present and past supervisors' opinions show him to have been an expert in the safety field with superior knowledge in all aspects of safety, a man "completely dedicated to safety." As the Wing Flying Safety Officer, he had been requalified in the C-121, first as a co- pilot on 14 Aug 1968, and later as an aircraft commander on 13 Dec 1968 (blanked word). During his tour in SEA he averaged 24 hours and two combat missions per month, flying as an attached pilot. Over the previous 30 days he had logged 23.1 hours, of which 11.6 was 1st pilot and 17.0 actual instrument time. The remarks of the flight examiner on the three check rides administered at Korat show him to be well qualified and highly skilled in the C-121. 16. Airfield Facilities: Not applicable. 17. Air Traffic Control and Navigational Aids: All navigational aids and air traffic control facilities were operating normally except the precision radar of the AN/MPN-14 and the time injector of the voice recorders. The precision radar had been NOTAM'ed and maintenance was in progress. Repair of the time injector delayed awaiting parts. (Sentence blanked out). The air traffic control services given BATCAT 21 was routine and in accordance with applicable directives. After normal control tower service during start engines, taxi and runup, BATCAT 21 was given the latest winds and cleared for take off on the ground control frequency. The tower operator then directed BATCAT 21 to switch to departure control frequency and monitor guard (Tab V-1). Immediately upon contacting Departure Control, BATCAT 21 queried the radar operator about the position of "that thunderstorm cell" and the radar operator reported the storm as stationary over the field extending 20 miles to the Southwest. The pilot of BATCAT 21 discussed the departure route with the controller and requested a right turn after takeoff instead of the usual left turn. The pilot also requested radar vectors after takeoff and the departure controller concurred. BATCAT 21 was initially directed to maintain runway heading for radar identification; this was changed to a heading of 280 degrees prior to departure. BATCAT 21 was airborne just prior to 1558 and reported turning to 280 degrees approximately one minute later. BATCAT 21 then requested an additional right turn to attempt to get out of severe turbulence. The request was approved. Neither primary or secondary (IFF) radar contact was established. Although the controller made continued attempts no further communications was established with BATCAT 21. RAPCON personnel continued attempting to contact BATCAT 21 and contacted the control tower personnel to determine if BATCAT 21 was in contact with that facility. Control tower personnel made a blanket radio call on all frequencies to BATCAT 21. At 1618 Base Operations was advised to initiate search and rescue procedures and they scrambled the rescue helicopter. Investigation revealed that the departure controller assigned 280 degrees heading to BATCAT 21 because, on radar, that area appeared to be the lightest area for the departing aircraft to get out of the storm. (Remainder of the paragraph blanked out, about 28 lines). 18. Weather Analysis: On 25 April 1969, the synoptic situation had not changed significantly, so the 25/1300 forecast was based on the premise that the thunderstorm activity would repeat the pattern of the previous days. At 1455 a weather warning was issued for the base valid from 1545 to 1800. The warning was for thunderstorms, with winds variable in direction with gusts to 35 knots, visibility reduced to 2 miles in thunderstorms with rainshowers and accompanying duststorm. Between 1530 and 1545, thunderstorm cells formed south southwest, and began moving northeast, toward the field. It was into the rain areas under one of these thunderstorm cells that the aircraft penetrated shortly after takeoff. The following observation was taken at 1555 and put on the base autowriter net at 1556: "The winds were 190 degrees at 18 knots with gusts to 26 knots, visibility was seven miles with thunderstorm in progress. The temperature was 29 degrees C, the dew point was 23 degrees C, and the altimeter setting was 29.70 inches. The cloud conditions were 3/8 cumulonimbus at 3500 feet, 4/8 cumulus at 4000 feet, 6/8 cirrus at 25,000 feet with the ceiling 4000 feet. Thunderstorms extended from the east through the south through the southwest and were moving towards the northeast. There was occasional lightning in cloud and cloud-to-ground south through southwest and occasional rainshowers occuring at the site. The field pressure altitude was 928 feet." At approximately two and one half miles after lift-off and about 500 feet altitude, the aircraft entered a down draft which also was an area of strong wind shear. The aircraft experienced turbulence, but more significantly, the relative wind swiftly changed from a 20 knot head wind to at least a 20 knot tail wind. As the aircraft descended it entered the region closest to the ground where the tail wind was the strongest. Witness reports and wind damage estimates indicate the there was a most likely 60 knot tail wind at the surface when the aircraft crashed. Crew Member List of Batcat 21, EC-121R 67-21493, April 25, 1969 Last Name First Name MI Rank Duty Injury --------- ---------- - ---- ---- ------ Heller Emerson E Lt Col AC Fatal Lunsford Paul R Maj P Fatal Brandom Thomas Maj P Fatal McCormick William C Jr. Lt Col N Fatal Marsh John A 1 Lt N Fatal Kidd George R Capt ZZ Fatal Fowler Kenneth W TSgt FE Fatal Delany Warren C TSgt FE Fatal Faulk Paul SSgt RO Fatal Booker Albert N TSgt ZZ Fatal Belflower James H TSgt ZZ Fatal Moore James D SSgt ZZ Fatal Davis Jerald C SSgt ZZ Fatal Steeley Mark M A1C ZZ Fatal Cotterill Michael J A1C ZZ Fatal DeForrest Ronald C A1C ZZ Fatal Stepp William D A1C ZZ Fatal Messing Mitch Sgt ZZ Fatal I tried to copy the report exactly, although some parts are difficult to read. The copy I have appears to be a photo copy of a photo copy. If a word was misspelled in the report, then I used the spelling as used in the report. Several places you will find my statement (blanked out). The copy I have of this report has several places where from one word, a sentence or an entire paragraph, are obliterated with a black "Magic Marker" type pen. I could not read the obliterated words. Any other errors are my own typing errors - Larry Westin, 3/5/00.